Core Werewolf hones its arsenal against Russia’s government organizations
BI.ZONE Threat Intelligence continues to monitor the Core Werewolf cluster that has been attacking Russia’s defense industry and critical infrastructure since 2021. In its latest campaigns, the threat actor turned to a new loader written in AutoIt and started delivering malicious files via Telegram (in addition to email).
- Adversaries extensively experiment with malware delivery methods, opting for instant messengers to target their victims with greater precision.
- Threat actors upgrade or review their arsenal to replace the tools that are becoming easier to detect.
- AutoIt remains a popular scripting language which allows attackers to develop their own malware.
Core Werewolf uses RAR archives to deliver SFX executables created with 7‑Zip. In some cases, the archives are protected with a password (e.g., 111
).
The SFX contains:
- an obfuscated malicious AutoIt script
- a legitimate executable of the AutoIt interpreter (v. 3.3.16.1)
- a PDF document
By running the SFX file, the user extracts its content into the %TEMP%
directory and launches the malicious script using the AutoIt interpreter.
The script is a loader meant to initiate the next stage.
The loader has the following capabilities:
- retrieves information about the compromised system: computer name, username, OS version, files and directories in the
Desktop
folder - creates a file
%TEMP%\<computer name>_<username>.txt
(e.g.,%TEMP%\DESKTOP-ET51AJO_Bruno.txt
) - renames the decoy file and moves it to the
%USERPROFILE%\Downloads
folder - opens the decoy file
- writes the list of files and directories in the
Desktop
folder into%TEMP%\<computer nаme>_<username>.txt
- reads the content of
%TEMP%\<computer name>_<username>.txt
for subsequent exfiltration to the C2 server - forms HTTP POST request headers to transfer information about the compromised system
- sends a POST request to
hxxp://<domain>/upload/<computer name>_<username>
- downloads the text file from the C2 server via the link
hxxp://<domain>/<computer name>_<username>/[0-9]{16}.txt
(e.g.,hxxp://1tutor[.]ru/DESKTOP-ET51AJO_Bruno/9733698215789059.txt
). Notably, the downloaded text file is stored in the%TEMP%
folder under a different name; for instance,5773395227936203.txt
. If a text file with this name already exists, the download process is aborted - reads the downloaded text file. If its content is equal to 1, the flag parameter for downloading the next stage AutoIt script is set to 1 and the downloaded text file gets deleted. Otherwise, nothing happens, and the AutoIt loader infinitely tries to receive the required text file from the C2 server
- checks the value of the flag parameter for downloading the next stage AutoIt script. If the value is equal to integer 1, then the next stage AutoIt script is downloaded from the C2 server via the link
hxxp://<domain>/<computer name>_<username>/[0-9]{16}.au3
(e.g.,hxxp://1tutor[.]ru/DESKTOP-ET51AJO_Bruno/9733698215789059.au3
). Once the next stage AutoIt script is successfully downloaded, it is executed using the AutoIt interpreter. After that, the AutoIt loader deletes the downloaded next stage AutoIt script together with the file%TEMP%\<computer name>_<username>.txt
containing the list of files and directories of theDesktop
folder. Accordingly, if such a next stage AutoIt script already exists, it is not downloaded and run again.
Similarly to previous Core Werewolf campaigns, the names of employed decoy files reflect their content. As seen in the example below, the content of the file План_работы_по_вопросам_эффективности_применения_огневого_поражения_РВиА__.pdf
(work plan on improving the use of firearms) matches its name:
RAR archive
- MD5:
36f96f199cf97ee8cbdd0271bd6598ca
- SHA-1:
2c2660577d4f853935a64c47cf8967a74e32d0f8
- SHA-256:
703835c57b8985141ef3ef652e2593935a47bd9779d08963c5eb973b8b82d08a
RAR archive (password: 111
)
- MD5:
9a454c6e336ac65df9a0330db086565f
- SHA-1:
2f835234ff7b497944220a72315c1b80d2474fa5
- SHA-256:
19ff0ce570aabefcab0eed08afdaffd16c5516d91962e099498ecaf97f394766
Разведывательная_информация_по_состоянию_на_2024_09_23_на_доклад_для_нач_штабов.exe
- MD5:
20e4539a0c14c63afa24744b3767f103
- SHA-1:
2fcc26ba22a592f7cd1dc81c212e79795fc05f76
- SHA-256:
d42942acee6154609c1c5f61bb0fb863c4598dd82e6d28af58c9dfbee71c4521
План_работы______по_вопросам____эффективности_применения_огневого_поражения_РВиА.exe
- MD5:
88849c55911c4b1866fb7099f9c54407
- SHA-1:
01bea2e4ff7bba835d88714ec4fde8d97a250639
- SHA-256:
b09807247282baaddb32ffe114b046325dd648a4c298f3b5c9addaa635b0520c
План_работы_по_вопросам_эффективности_применения_огневого_поражения_РВиА__.exe
- MD5:
e058d942a6dadfb09bd652ce1e1b2518
- SHA-1:
bcef3e23516e7df558b07da2edee8c47398a2472
- SHA-256:
114de7d5e7dd6088f68705d519fc35530433506965ec5288e9dfb005bfec73c8
План_и_расписание__работы_комиссии_довести_командирам_частей_и_НШ.exe
- MD5:
9c0933a8a4fcb108dae9ee4cf9f7645b
- SHA-1:
7d53b53514fd54af5e547c02eb8163dbd25f79ca
- SHA-256:
6a3584f8e6b5f8e2fb5826aa0f042bf30b06e7467f022499a71273e15daaa216
Malicious obfuscated AutoIt script (downloader):
1409008805926544.au3
- MD5:
6a495d68c106da8e9e4ec4bab72969c7
- SHA-1:
871a675d43758907d02d5b7e57d8a96f70dd3b27
- SHA-256:
a049cc364151ddfb3b87c11050a9b027ec4a1687ae4415b8d07afa4bc7aeaced
6999704557038434.au3
- MD5:
2c77773840821a49d71ac7c9e31258f9
- SHA-1:
35da880d75ab18f132dfed65adf545e079a99f55
- SHA-256:
2b62b9481c0bcdf46a24a792f44e152ea5b7c5143cb06af9d82ff8c2c8433551
8090622255964677.au3
- MD5:
a3bd5a90c900bd78b015804c2e2159c6
- SHA-1:
80ef6745cd0412ab587def958f6425de2b144935
- SHA-256:
731b4673f28da5d8b48f016a478be4e1ffea247d5b44a6612c506110b8fdd97c
8954304834437030.au3
- MD5:
13dbc816bca4f7668452fd8d28bb95e1
- SHA-1:
5eba332d8372d94d17e87b6c8234b2cad052bb17
- SHA-256:
3cfc1ecd00d52349c0b1ac0692774b31a97342330ef664b546fa3b8aa1d3a6c2
Legitimate AutoIt interpreter:
9481940632028706.exe
, 3823822393935372.exe
, 0554702337892303.exe
, 6394810657788120.exe
- MD5:
0adb9b817f1df7807576c2d7068dd931
- SHA-1:
4a1b94a9a5113106f40cd8ea724703734d15f118
- SHA-256:
4f7de1644e519d09371b8afcbbf40ff3bd56d76ce4df48479a4ab884b
PDF decoys:
Zf26q26l16s86L56i9.fD37p97U07G77t07B9
- MD5:
f3b95a48f3415e8909b979f9219a68b4
- SHA-1:
4f47703cdc419e2942ff2697b7ee40a4d703956f
- SHA-256:
eecfa15d69a6322fac39e945d68664a037e48a60644a76acd8b49490e6c93c06
gT13b43C53J83b93F9.My36b26K06h16o46G8
- MD5:
22a0ffa0c20131cd10fe074dbbcdd262
- SHA-1:
2ba32d676b04da49276527d4b428c36b2cb61b81
- SHA-256:
75cd7ef3e87d59f32939832e3b5eeb586d0fc1467721a30b64132bc5f833697f
lD06w16k16e26m36j5.qG74F64k84I94V24Q9
- MD5:
770c3ea782ea6d4430b64e24ebce8ca8
- SHA-1:
21b551deb21e6218741e424086b1eaad0064fe65
- SHA-256:
00ec82306c9df4aee9dda42933ed55afa9e53ed74c2018bc0ce43d87edad2f98
GL11H01e11a71b41M1.nc64b64m74X24a84O3
- MD5:
6834ec008b5dc8980a1c7a3e13a1a8ea
- SHA-1:
a2146ccfffbabed1501e8ad00fada778e3817f94
- SHA-256:
a8ea0f64e7e08d59b45068c1ff4eda4d7fd9d92148cd3d4c664da9c18aaf1f32
dsksb[.]ru
1tutor[.]ru
conversesuisse[.]net
cntula[.]ru
188.127.240[.]131
80.85.155[.]134
178.20.46[.]163
31.192.107[.]165
Tactic | Technique | Procedure |
---|---|---|
Execution |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Core Werewolf uses |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: AutoHotKey & AutoIT |
Core Werewolf uses the AutoIt loader to download and execute the next stage AutoIt script |
|
Defense Evasion |
Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
Core Werewolf deletes the files created and downloaded during the AutoIt loader’s execution |
Masquerading |
Core Werewolf uses names similar to the document titles in the self‑extracting archives. Core Werewolf uses the Adobe Acrobat Reader icon in the self‑extracting archives |
|
Obfuscated Files or Information |
Core Werewolf obfuscates the AutoIt loader's code |
|
Discovery |
File and Directory Discovery |
Core Werewolf retrieves the list of files and folders in the |
System Information Discovery |
Core Werewolf retrieves the computer name and OS version |
|
System Owner/User Discovery |
Core Werewolf retrieves the username of the compromised system |
|
Command and Control |
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
Core Werewolf uses HTTP to communicate with the C2 server. Core Werewolf employs a POST request to send the compromised host’s telemetry to the C2 server |
Ingress Tool Transfer |
Core Werewolf uses the AutoIt loader to download the next stage AutoIt script and run it |
The BI.ZONE EDR rules below can help organizations detect the described malicious activity:
win_th_run_autolt_from_temp
win_discovery_owner_and_users_system
win_discovery_system_information
win_access_to_ti_observed_host_from_nonbrowsers
win_execution_of_ti_observed_file
Understanding current attack methods and tools is important for mapping out the cyber threat landscape. For this purpose, we recommend BI.ZONE Threat Intelligence, a dedicated portal that contains the most up-to-date information about attack campaigns against specific infrastructures. The solution provides information about attack trends, threat actors, and their modus operandi. This data helps to ensure the effective operation of security solutions, accelerate incident response, and protect the company from the most critical threats.